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1 INTRODUCTION 
This paper examines the economics of ‘public sector information’ (PSI). Public sector 
information is information held by a public sector organisation, for example a government 
department or, more generally, any entity which is majority owned and/or controlled by 
government.2 To have a convenient term we label the entity holding or providing the 
information the ‘public sector information holder’ (PSIH).3 Classic examples, of public sector 
information in most countries would include, among many others (see Table 1 for a more 
substantial list): geospatial data, meteorological information and official statistics. 
With the development of the ‘knowledge’ economy, driven largely by the advance of digital 
technology, data plays an increasingly prominent role within our societies, both commercially 
and otherwise. Large and growing businesses have been built on collecting, organising, and 
analysing data.4 Furthermore, almost all businesses, especially those in the services sector, 
increasingly utilise, and require, a wide variety of data sources to conduct their activities. At the 
same time, citizens and others have come to depend on, and indeed expect, access to a wide-
range of information – be it for planning journeys or keeping up to date with the activities of 
their governments. 
While much data is supplied from outside the public sector, compared to other parts of the 
economy, the public sector plays an unusually prominent role. In many key areas, a public 
sector organisation may be the only, or one among very few, sources of the particular 
information it provides (e.g. for geospatial and meteorological information). As such the 
                                                        
1 Some portions of this chapter are based on Pollock et al., Models of Public Sector Information Provision via 
Trading Funds, 2008, which was commissioned by HM Treasury and BERR and authored in collaboration 
with David Newbery and Lionel Bently. This chapter was previously published as Cambridge Working Paper in 
Economics, No. 0920. 
2 In the UK, for example, several of the major providers of PSI are ‘Trading Funds’. These have a quasi-
autonomous position but are 100% owned by government and have a ‘parent’ government department.  
3 It is perfectly possible, in fact frequently the case, that the holder of information does not make it available. 
It is for this reason that we foreground the ‘holding’ aspect over the ‘provision’ aspect in our terminology. 
It is also possible that one entity may hold the data while the other makes it available. In this case take the 
PSIH as denoting the combined entities.  
4 Search engines, today among the most well-known and most profitable enterprises on the planet, would fit 
squarely within this category.  
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policies adopted regarding maintenance, access and re-use of PSI can have a very significant 
impact on the economy and society more widely.5 
The potential importance of (public sector) information can also be gauged from a simple but 
significant analogy: just as the supply of basic physical infrastructure – power, transport, 
telecommunications – is essential to the traditional economy, so the supply of basic information 
‘infrastructure’ – core datasets in the major areas of geography, weather, transport etc. – is 
essential to the ‘information’ economy. Not only does this comparison provide an indicator of 
the likely importance of public sector information but it is also illuminating in other ways. 
First, core information providers and existing utilities often have similar cost structures where 
large fixed costs are combined with low marginal costs. Relatedly, many utilities, at least in some 
areas of their activities, have ‘natural’ monopolies just as PSIHs may do in some areas of their 
business. Second, utilities are usually providing ‘essential’ infrastructure which, if not directly 
essential to government, is essential to the general economy. Third, precisely because of the 
factors just mentioned, many utilities are regulated and have been for some time. It seems likely 
that these regulatory experiences can provide useful analogies when considering the situation of 
PSIHs (few, if any, of which have any independent regulation at the present time). 
Even from this brief introduction, it should be evident that the operation of public sector 
information provision raises a variety of questions – empirical and theoretical; social and 
economic; regulatory and otherwise. Here, we address many, though not all, of them. We begin 
with a basic overview of public sector information, what it is, its salient features from an 
economic point of view, and some important terminology. The next sections then focus on the 
central issues of funding and regulatory structure. That is: who should pay to maintain PSI and 
what regulatory structure should be put in place to support this. In particular, we ask a) which 
of the three possible groups – users, updaters and government – should bear the burden of 
paying for the production and maintenance of public sector information; and b) how can a 
policymaker best manage the commitment, incentive and efficiency issues that will necessarily 
arise. 
1.1 WHAT PUBLIC SECTOR INFORMATION DO WE CONSIDER? 
We impose three important restrictions on the types of PSI we consider in this paper. First, we 
restrict ourselves to digital information, that is information which can be made available in 
digital form (note this does not mean the data was originally collected in digital form, simply 
that it can be made available in digital form). This assumption ensures that we are always 
dealing with material whose marginal cost of production/dissemination may be taken to be 
zero. 
Second, we restrict our attention to the provision of non-personal information, that is PSI 
which either contains no personal information or does so at a level of aggregation and 
anonymisation such that personal (private) information cannot be identified. This excludes 
datasets such as individual tax records or health data but does not exclude items such as data on 
property ownership (traditionally publicly available) or even information on vehicle registration 
if suitably anonymised. As such, non-personal data still includes the great bulk of (socially and 
commercially) important information. A non-exhaustive list of the types of material we are 
considering is provided in Table 1. 
                                                        
5 Quite apart from the immediate competition issues raised by the existence of a government controlled 
(and often government-mandated) monopoly.  
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Third, public sector information can be taken to include any piece of ‘information’ produced or 
held within the public sector. However, here we wish to focus on relatively large and coherent 
information sets rather than the average memo, pamphlet or webpage. 
Table 1: Examples of public sector information and their providers in the UK 
Type  PSIH  Comments  
Company Information Companies House  Company registrations, returns etc.  
Vehicle Registration  DVLA  Statistical summaries suitably anonymised.  
Physical Property  HM Land Registry  Ownership, boundaries, charges etc.  
Intellectual ‘Property’  IP Office  Patents, Trademarks etc.  
Meteorological Data  Meteorological Office All forms of weather and climate related information.  
Geospatial 
Information  
Ordnance Survey  Traditional ‘mapping’ data but also route and aerial 
information.  
Hydrographic 
Information  
Hydrographic Office  Marine charts etc.  
Socioeconomic 
Statistics  
Statistics Authority  GDP, Unemployment, Population etc.  
Environmental Data  Environment Agency  Widely varying but including standard pollution and 
ecological data.  
Official Gazettes  OPSI and others  Official notices etc.  
Transport statistics  Department of 
Transport  
Journey and planning statistics, public transport 
information etc.  
 
1.2 KEY FEATURES OF PSI AND PSIHS 
There are a few key facts central to any analysis of the maintenance and provision of public 
sector information. These are, in no particular order: the nonrivalrous nature of public sector 
information, its associated cost structure (high fixed costs, very low marginal costs), its high 
potential for use and re-use, and, lastly, the two-sided nature of those who hold and maintain 
the information. We discuss each of these in term. 
1.2.1 Nonrivalry (Zero Marginal Cost) 
One person’s use of a piece of information does not exclude another from doing so. This 
equates to the fact that it is (approximately) costless to reproduce a piece of (digital) 
information once the first ‘copy’ is made. This contrasts with ‘normal’ physical goods: if you are 
using my car I cannot also use it at the same time. However, if one shares a piece a information 
another gains without any corresponding loss to oneself. Formally, we can also state this as the 
good having (approximately) zero marginal cost of production.6 
                                                        
6 Production includes copying the data and distributing it to a new user. At the present time, both may have 
some cost. However, even for large datasets the cost of temporary storage and bandwidth is likely to be 
very small – and certainly tiny relative to any other cost involving in managing that data.  
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1.2.2 High Fixed Costs 
Collecting, processing and storing data often have substantial fixed costs. Fixed costs are in 
some ways the ‘flip-side’ of the nonrivalry of information goods: while they cost nothing to 
reproduce once you have the first copy producing that first copy may be expensive. 
1.2.3 High Potential for Use and Re-use 
Public sector information, like much other information, has the important feature that there are 
many heterogeneous ways in which it can be used and re-used. This potential, especially for re-
use in other products and services, relates to the ease with which information can be copied and 
modified, and it is also a major factor distinguishing it from other goods. For example, once a 
piece of steel has been used to make a car there is no easy way for it to be re-used elsewhere. 
However, using a piece of geodata in one particular way in one application does not prevent it 
being used in a very different way elsewhere. Furthermore if modifications made to the data for 
one particular use prove valuable elsewhere those changes can be easily, and almost costlessly, 
shared. 
1.2.4 Two-sided Nature of PSIHS 
Any information holder can be seen as having two sides to their operation: the input 
(write/update) and the output (read/use) side. For example, a registrar of companies must 
collect the data for its register (input/write) and then may supply this information to third 
parties (output/read). Similarly, a manager of geospatial information makes changes to their 
database in response to surveys and changes in the environment (input) and then supplies this 
data to third parties (output). This fact – that all datasets involve both read and write operations 
– has important implications for policy as it means that: charges can be made on both sides. 
That is, the revenue needed to create, update and maintain datasets can be levied (in most cases) 
on both the read and write side of the Holder’s operations. That is, both those seeking to write 
(for example register a company) and those seeking to read (get a copy of the dataset or some 
portion thereof) can be charged. Thus, a policymaker seeking to fund the production and 
maintenance of a dataset (or datasets) has three possible options (not mutually exclusive): 
 Government funding: fund from general government revenues  
 Updater funding: charge those who make changes to the dataset(s)  
 User funding: charge those who use the dataset(s).  
Which of these should/can be used will depend on the social, technological and political 
circumstances. In particular, option two is not always possible because there are no ‘updaters’ to 
charge – as with meteorological data for example. For this reason, when discussing funding 
options we will focus on comparing the first and third options – government funding versus 
user funding – as these methods are always available. However, in many cases, option two is 
also feasible. This is important because politically it may be easier to alter the balance between 
‘read’ versus ‘write’ funding than to move to direct payments from government (central or 
local), particularly if the immediate costs would be significant. We therefore return to a 
discussion of this particular option at the end of 3.4. 
1.3 UPSTREAM AND DOWNSTREAM 
One of the primary qualities of information is that the same item can be presented, and re-used, 
in a variety of different forms. For example, the same piece of geodata (perhaps describing the 
roads and features in a particular neighbourhood) may be available both as part of a large 
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comprehensive dataset or in a printed or digital map. Importantly, while many people, once 
given access to the basic data, may be able to produce the maps there may be only one source 
for the original, basic, data (the PSIH). As this distinction will be very important for regulating 
pricing it is valuable to formalise it. Thus, we say a particular dataset held by a PSIH is:7 
 Upstream: if it cannot be substituted directly from other sources 
 Downstream: if it could be provided by another organisation should that organisation 
have access to the relevant upstream information.  
Thus, downstream information supplied by a PSIH can be seen as being, at least potentially, in 
competition with information from other suppliers. By contrast, for upstream information the 
PSIH is the sole source and faces no significant competition in its supply.8 For this reason we 
largely focus on upstream public sector information on the assumption that a) downstream 
depends on upstream b) if upstream is correctly managed downstream will, thanks to 
competition, take care of itself.9 
1.4 FUNDING: CHARGING AND USAGE POLICIES 
Section 1.2.4 discussed the three major sources of funding for a PSIH: government, updaters 
and users. These options naturally translate into charging policies – that is prices charged to 
(external) users and updaters.10 There are three basic data charging policies for a policymaker to 
choose from: 
 setting prices to maximise profit given the demand faced by the PSIH.11 Where the 
product being supplied does not face competition then this will naturally result in 
monopoly pricing. Here, the usual assumption is that the PSIH will be (more than) fully 
                                                        
7 This definition is closely related to the OFT’s definition of ‘unrefined’ and ‘refined’ data in Office of Fair 
Trading (2006, p. 5, para. 1.5). In fact, in meaning the two sets of terms are essentially identical. However, 
we prefer the ‘upstream/downstream’ distinction for several reasons. First, this is more usual terminology 
within the competition literature. Second, ‘unrefined/refined’ has some unfortunate connotations. 
Specifically ‘refining’ has obvious suggestions of ‘processing’ or ‘distilling’. But for PSIH data, while, in 
general, one would expect ‘unrefined’ data to be fairly ‘unprocessed’ this need not necessarily be so (after 
all, almost all data has been processed to some degree to get it into a usable form). ‘Upstream/downstream’ 
terminology does not suffer from this defect yet still preserves the underlying meaning.  
8 Note that it is possible that the PSIH is still the sole supplier of downstream information – as long as it 
would be possible for another organisation to supply that information it should be classified as 
downstream. This highlights the importance of having a ‘level playing field’, in particular any other 
organisation should have access to upstream information on the same terms as the PSIH itself and there 
should be no cross-subsidy between upstream and downstream in the PSIH’s operations.  
9 Competition is not, of course, always a panacea. However, it is clear that upstream must be the first area 
to be addressed. If, even after upstream has been dealt with, there remain downstream issues these can then 
be addressed in their turn.  
10 In most cases a given charging policy can be applied independently to users and updaters.  
11 There is occasional reference to ‘market-based pricing’. It is not entirely clear what this means since 
several of these pricing strategies involve attention to the structure of the demand curve (that is the 
price/demand trade-off displayed by the market). However our interpretation is that is intended to indicate 
that the PSIH behaves as any other ‘normal’ market participant would and sets a price to maximise profits 
given the underlying demand curve.  
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funded from its revenues and so will require any direct12 government funding – in fact, 
as a public sector organisation, the PSIH will be returning any profits it makes to the 
government.  
 setting prices equal to average long-run costs (including, for example, all fixed costs 
related to data production).13 As with profit-maximisation, under this approach it is 
assumed that the PSIH will not require direct government funding.  
 setting prices equal to the short-run marginal cost, that is the cost of supplying data to 
an extra user. Note that, as we are considering digital data, this cost is essentially zero 
and marginal cost and zero cost pricing are identical. In this case the PSIHs revenues 
from maintaining and supplying information will fall below its costs and the PSIH will 
depend on direct government funding (a ‘subsidy’) to continue its information 
operations.  
When considering the supply of information, price is not the only consideration: in addition 
one must specify what those who acquire the information can do, in particular, what restrictions 
there are on re-use and redistribution. In general, and for obvious reasons,14 profit-maximising 
and average-cost pricing to users are associated with the PSIH retaining strong control over re-
use and redistribution – in particular the ability to impose any conditions on re-use and 
redistribution of its data permitted by the underlying intellectual property rights existing in that 
material. 
For marginal cost pricing, by contrast, it would be natural for the PSIH to make the data 
‘openly’ available so that anyone who acquired data would be free to re-use or redistribute in 
any way they saw fit.15 
2 REGULATION: COMMITMENT, INCENTIVES AND EFFICIENCY  
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
This section considers how best to address the major regulatory questions raised by public 
sector information, particularly those related to commitment, incentives and efficiency. As 
discussed in the previous section, there are close analogies between PSIHs (especially the major 
                                                        
12 Note, however, that as the government may well be a (large) customer of the PSIH this does not mean 
the government does not make payments to the PSIH – just that these payments are made like ‘any’ other 
customer (see Section 2 on Regulation for more discussion of this issue).  
13 There are a various subtleties as to what exactly cost-recovery entails which are discussed further below. 
See the discussion in the corresponding section of Pollock et al. (2008). 
14 If free redistribution and/or re-use any user would immediate be able to compete with the original 
supplier thereby undermining their ability to charge. It is this logic that lies behind the grant of most IP 
rights.  
15 Note that this would not exclude the imposition of conditions entirely. For example, the PSIH might 
wish to impose ‘integrity’ conditions so that where its data was supplied by others it was clearly marked as 
only coming indirectly from the original source and therefore potentially no longer having the same 
reliability (such a provision already exists with the PSI ‘click-use’ license in the UK). PSIHs might also wish 
make certain ‘public-interest’ restrictions. For example, the Land Registry in the UK already prohibits usage 
of its data for unsolicited mail-shots. Going even further PSIHs could utilise share-alike type licenses of the 
sort popular in open-source and open-knowledge communities. Here, material is made freely available for 
use, re-use and redistribution but with the ‘share-alike’ proviso that any derivative work is distributed under 
the same ‘open’ terms as the original material.  
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ones) and traditional utilities, particularly in regard of their cost structures and the role they play 
in their particular sectors of the economy, and these analogies, and the existing regulatory 
experience in other areas, will necessarily inform our discussion here. 
At the same time, we should note some important differences. Most significant is that, 
compared with many other ‘regulated’ industries, government takes multiple roles in relation to 
PSIHs. In particular, government often acts as shareholder, regulator/parent, and customer. 
Furthermore government’s customer role is far more prominent in relation to PSIHs than in 
relation to any other ‘utility’ – government is sometimes by far the largest customer for PSIH 
data and in some cases may account for over 50% of ‘sales’.16 
This close relationship is reflected in the status of PSIHs which are either fully inside 
‘government’ or, even when quasi-autonomous, have no separate legal identity. This means, for 
example, that while PSIHs can draft detailed ‘Memorandums of Understanding’ or ‘Customer 
Supplier Agreements’ with (other parts of) government it is not clear whether these are legally 
enforceable contracts – after all, it is not possible for a government to sue itself. This problem is 
made worse by the fact that the government-to-PSIH relationship is frequently rather opaque, 
with it being unclear what a given PSIH can and cannot do in relation to product supply, 
charging etc. 
To give a concrete example, one of the advantages often cited of average-cost or profit-
maximising charging policies for a PSIH is the greater freedom and certainty it gives PSIHs 
because they need no longer be dependent on direct government funding (discussed further 
below). However, in many cases (other parts of) government are the major purchaser of data 
from a PSIH. In this case it is entirely possible for the government to use its role as a 
monopsonist to reduce suddenly its payments in lean years (just as the government might 
choose to reduce a subsidy). Conversely, it is not clear what would necessarily prevent a PSIH 
using its position as a sole supplier of some data products to raise charges to government very 
sharply. Obviously, in practice, neither of these outcomes are particularly likely, precisely 
because of the close connection between PSIHs and government. This connection is clearly 
very important but is, as yet, largely unformalised in most countries. 
Finally, a crucial point to bear in mind is that many of the PSIHs enjoy a near-monopoly on at 
least some of their data, a monopoly, furthermore, made possible or strengthened by 
government activity. For example, in the UK, for ‘registration-based’ PSIHs such as Companies 
House, the Land Registry or the DVLA it is a statutory requirement to deposit data with them. 
In the case of the Met Office, in addition to the natural monopoly afforded by the high fixed 
costs of data collection, the government provides substantial funding for the PWS (Public 
Weather Service).17 Furthermore, in most cases the data marketplace in which PSIHs operate 
have a clear upstream/downstream structure with the PSIH ‘monopoly’ most prominent in the 
upstream market. This presents a whole raft of competition issues, particularly in relation to 
tying, exclusionary dealing, predatory pricing and the like. As a result it would seem clear that 
some form of price/access regulation would be necessary if abuses of market power were to be 
                                                        
16 For example, in the UK the Met Office income from government whether via sales or subsidy is over 
80% of revenue. Even for Ordnance Survey where the proportion of revenue coming from government 
has been falling the proportion is close to 50% and for particular product ranges may be well over that. At 
the same time, for some other PSIHs, especially those which are registration-based, the proportion of 
income from government is very low (approximately zero in the case of the Land Registry, for example).  
17 The Met Office have sought to address some of the problems these my cause from a competition 
perspective by maintaining a clear division between their ‘wholesale’ and ‘retail’ arms with the same access 
terms applied to all, including their own retail division, when purchasing data from the ‘wholesale’ arm.  
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avoided, and adequate competition and innovation be encouraged (at least downstream). It 
would also make it extremely difficult to permit PSIHs to pursue a profit-maximisation 
(monopoly-pricing) strategy in the absence of some form of regulatory oversight. 
2.2 COMMITMENT 
In most analysis of funding structures, including that below, it is explicitly assumed that 
government would provide any necessary subsidy to maintain PSIH income at a level sufficient 
to maintain the relevant dataset (should a charging policy be chosen that resulted in PSIHs 
income dropping below costs). This implicitly assumes an ability for government to commit to 
payments both now and in the future. Such ability cannot be taken for granted. Governments 
around the world have frequently demonstrated the difficulty of making such commitments and 
the impact of political considerations on infrastructure investment.18 Sudden fluctuations, or 
simply reductions, in the level of subsidy would be likely to have substantial negative effects on 
the ability of PSIHs to maintain both the range and quality of their information. Clearly, the 
issue of commitment is an important one to consider. 
The issue of commitment is not solely confined to the case where subsidies are being provided. 
Consider, for example, the hypothetical situation where a PSIH is following a policy of profit-
maximisation but still retains its current institutional set-up where it sits within the public 
sector. Suppose then that the PSIH decides that one obvious way to increase profits is to 
increase charges to central and local government, perhaps to the extent that some subsections 
are no longer able to purchase the data. In this case there might be substantial pressure brought 
to bear by government on the PSIH to price more ‘reasonably’, or government might consider 
amending the PSIHs charging policy. In either case the government would have reversed its 
‘commitment’ to allow the PSIH to pursue a policy of profit-maximisation. Thus it should also 
be clear that while the ‘commitment’ issue may be most prominent in the case where 
government is providing funds it arises in relation to all of the possible pricing policies. In fact, 
as discussed further below, the commitment issue relates more to the institutional and 
regulatory structure in which PSIHs operate than to the chosen charging policy.19 
2.3 INCENTIVES AND EFFICIENCY 
In addition to the basic commitment issues it is also the case that different charging policies, 
and the associated different relationships with central government, might result in different 
incentives faced by PSIHs. In particular charging policy could affect incentives for 
responsiveness, innovation (development of new products), cost reduction and general 
performance. 
For example, a PSIH which has been mandated to price data products at marginal cost may 
have reduced incentives to develop new products as it will not be able to reap any particular 
benefits from doing so.20 Conversely, if marginal cost pricing was combined with some kind of 
per unit output subsidy this could result in incentives for over-investment in quality and capacity 
                                                        
18 For example, in 1991, the UK government promised an extra 750 million pounds to the Tube to do 
renovation work only to have to reverse this commitment a year later due to sudden pressure on the 
national finances. (London Review Books, 27: 9, 5 May 2005). See also the discussion of the Land Registry’s 
experience in the early 1990s below.  
19 See also the discussion of the government’s multiple roles above.  
20 The same could be true in theory from average cost pricing though this depends somewhat on the degree 
to which the organisation engages in cost recovery at the organisational rather than the per product level.  
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improvements because, by over-investing, the PSIH stimulates demand and obtains a larger 
subsidy. 
In terms of responsiveness an organisation operating a more ‘commercial’ pricing policy (e.g. 
profit-maximising) might lead a PSIH to be more customer oriented – more responsive to 
complaints and more concerned about general service quality. 
Similarly, wherever a PSIH is regulated (i.e. in all cases except profit-maximisation) it may lack 
adequate incentives to reduce costs – because any reduction in costs may be partially 
appropriated by the regulator (either in the form of a lower subsidy or lower prices). 
2.4 INFORMATION AND ENFORCEMENT 
All of the charging policies considered with the exception of profit-maximisation require some 
form of regulation (by government or otherwise) to ensure compliance. Even in the case of 
profit-maximisation the government’s role as sole shareholder would necessitate some form of 
oversight. 
One might assume that marginal cost (and zero-cost) pricing would require more information 
(and more effort on the regulator’s part) than average cost pricing. In particular as it is unlikely 
that the level of investment is constant over time there will be important questions as to how 
subsidies (and price regulation) were allowed to change over time to reflect these needs. 
However, as already alluded to above, under cost-recovery managers may have an incentive to 
‘over-invest’ since higher costs can be covered by increasing revenues (‘gold-plating’). 
Additionally, with the ability to set prices in at least some areas PSIHs could also behave 
inefficiently, for example, by investing in poor projects, while still complying with cost-recovery 
at the organisational level since losses could be made up by raising prices or cross-subsidies 
from other parts of the business. The information needed by a regulator to avoid these 
outcomes is similar to that required when monitoring a marginal-cost or zero-cost regime – in 
particular the regulator will need to monitor investments in order to ensure that they are at the 
efficient level. 
Leaving aside these investment questions it is certainly true that different pricing regimes 
provide different information about the demand curve (and therefore implicitly about 
surplus).21 Specifically, if the given pricing policy is being pursued at the per-product level, then 
profit-maximisation and average-cost both have the advantage that they guarantee that a given 
product is only produced if the surplus from doing so is positive. By contrast under marginal 
cost pricing it is possible for a product to be produced (and subsidised) whose net surplus is 
negative. However it should be noted that this particular point can be taken both ways. A 
profit-maximisation or average-cost regime ensures that a product is produced if and only if the 
producer surplus is positive (i.e. revenues are larger than costs). Thus there may be products 
whose total (consumer plus producer) surplus is positive – and therefore worth producing – but 
whose producer surplus is negative. These then are products which might well be produced 
under a marginal cost regime but would not be under an average cost or profit-maximising 
regime. 
2.5 DISCUSSION 
The main points of the previous sections are drawn together in Table 2. One important 
possibility to bear in mind when reading this, and when considering these issues in general, is 
                                                        
21 This will also be discussed below, see Figure 1 in particular.  
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the likelihood that any given charging rate might be applied selectively. For example, different 
charging policies could be applied to upstream and downstream data – say, marginal cost for 
upstream and average cost, or profit maximisation, for downstream.  
Table 2: Charging policies and regulatory/governance issues 
Issue  Profit Max.  Avg. Cost  Marginal/Zero Cost  
Commitment  Good.a Largely dependent on 
regulatory / governance 
structure. 
Largely dependent on 
regulatory / governance 
structure.b 
Incentives  Optimal for PSIH though 
likely non-optimal for 
other market participants 
(see next item). 
Risk of over-investment 
and inefficiency (costs too 
high). Monitoring required 
of investment, quality and 
costs. 
Risk of either over or 
under performance 
depending on subsidy 
function. Monitoring 
required of investment, 
quality and costs. 
Distortion of 
Competition  
Upstream: major issue 
given dominant position of 
PSIHs. Downstream: 
minor as long as cross-
subsidy is limited. 
Significant issue if PSIH 
provides internal access to 
upstream material on 
different terms to external 
firms (esp. if cost 
allocation between 
upstream and downstream 
is opaque).c 
Minor.d 
Information  Not relevant as no 
regulation. 
Single point on demand 
curve where revenue 
covers costs.e At aggregate 
level know PSIH covers 
total costs. 
Single point on demand 
curve where price equals 
marginal cost. 
 
a Though could depend on relationship of government and PSIH – particularly risk that profits 
are ex-post ‘appropriated’. 
b Could be a greater issue than under ‘average-cost’ because here the government may be 
providing subsidies. 
c Oversight would still be required here to prevent the use of discriminatory tariffs. For example, 
a PSIH could set a tariff consisting of a one-off, but very large, fee for all its data. This might 
then exclude external users who only need a small part of that data. Similarly without transparent 
cost allocation under average cost pricing a PSIH might have an incentive to overcharge for 
upstream access to exclude downstream entrants – a problem familiar from the 
telecommunications literature, see e.g. Farrell (2003). 
d Though the provision of subsidy may retard entrants who wish to compete directly with the 
PSIH in the provision of data. However, as long as the marginal cost of data provision was 
largely confined to those datasets of which the PSIH was sole provider this would not become 
an issue. 
e Though where a PSIH performs cost-recovery only at the aggregate level the exact relation of 
revenue to costs for a given product may be unclear. 
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Thus rather than situating a PSIH in a single column it is important to keep in mind that it 
could be ‘spread’ across several, with different parts of a PSIH’s operations under different 
charging policies. The table attempts to reflect this, at least to some extent, by explicitly noting 
where a particular point relates only to data with particular properties. 
There are two major lessons to take from all of this. First: there is no direct linkage of charging 
policy to governance issues – in fact governance questions are best seen as orthogonal to 
pricing ones. In particular, all policies require some form of regulation to function well. Second, 
and relatedly: charging policy is not the central issue when considering problems such as 
commitment and incentives which are the primary determinants of performance in terms of 
data quality, investment and efficiency. Rather, charging policy is best seen as secondary, and 
dependent upon, the primary matter of the regulatory/governance structures under which data 
provision (and collection) by PSIHs occurs. 
2.5.1 Commitment 
To illustrate, consider a concrete example provided by the Land Registry, one of the major UK 
Trading Funds. In the late 1980s and early 1990s just prior to becoming a Trading Fund, the 
Land Registry operated a cost-recovery regime in which charges were set to cover costs. 
However, it did not control its revenues but rather returned them to central government. The 
Land Registry management would then go ‘cap in hand’ to negotiate their budget for the next 
financial year. According to them, in the late 1980s this resulted in a degree of underfunding, 
which made it impossible to deal with the level of applications they were receiving. As a result a 
large backlog of applications built up. 
In 1993 they became a Trading Fund, in part because of the problems that had been 
encountered. Since then this sort of problem has not recurred and, in their opinion, the greater 
autonomy provided by being a Trading Fund means that investment can be planned better and 
they are less subject to the vagaries of ‘vote-funding’.22 Note that throughout the basic charging 
policy was unchanged with cost-recovery both before and after Trading Fund status was 
obtained. Hence, here it would seem clear that if the improvements in service quality were due 
to anything, they were due to changes in the regulatory environment, in particular the greater 
certainty and autonomy provided by the Trading Fund structure. 
To take this point further, whenever PSIH funding is directly controlled by government, there 
will be potential commitment issues under all pricing regimes (see discussion above). Moving to 
a different regulatory structure could improve this. For example, if PSIHs were more legally 
independent it would permit the creation of arm’s length legally-binding contracts regarding 
both subsidies and purchases. Combined with independent and transparent regulation this sort 
of structure would go a long way to eliminating concerns about the ability of government to 
deliver on subsidy and purchase promises and eliminate fears about the effects of such risks on 
the quality and availability of PSIH data. 
                                                        
22 Though interestingly all of their fees are still set by government through fees orders (more precisely the 
fees are set by the Lord Chancellor and then approved by HM Treasury). Thus government still largely 
controls their year to year revenues (and hence, one would imagine, their investment levels and incentives). 
This suggests that, in this case, the major benefit of Trading Fund status was not to reduce the level of 
(central) government control but to reduce the risk that government would, especially in ‘difficult times’, 
take too great a share of Land Registry revenues for other purposes leaving the Land Registry with 
insufficient funds to carry on its operations. In this sense Trading Fund status could be seen as a form of 
‘ring-fencing’ in relation to the Land Registry budget.  
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In particular, it should be emphasised that a change in charging policy, for example to use 
marginal cost pricing for some part of a PSIH’s products, does not require removing a PSIH’s 
independence or a reversion to ‘vote-funding’. In fact, as just suggested, such a change would 
optimally be combined with improvements in the independence and transparency of the 
governance structures to provide PSIHs (and government) with more certainty, clarity and 
independence than they currently have.23 
2.5.2 Incentives and Efficiency 
Coming to the question of incentives and performance, the differences between charging 
regimes are, if anything, even less significant than when considering commitment. As already 
discussed, without adequate regulatory/governance structures in place, all charging regimes can 
result in poor incentives, inefficiency and overall poor performance.24 Conversely with a good 
regulatory/governance structure in place any of the charging policies could be implemented 
without jeopardising the incentives, efficiency, and performance of a PSIH. 
Consider the current situation in many jurisdictions for some of the larger PSIHs, which 
roughly approximates to capital-based regulation – a PSIH is expected to cover costs and make 
some specified return on capital. As is well known, this approach has significant incentive and 
efficiency problems. First, and most obviously, the organisation no longer has incentives to 
minimise costs but rather seeks to match costs to revenue. Furthermore, given the market 
power PSIHs have, at least in some markets, overspending can always be addressed by raising 
prices and increasing revenue. 
Second, and relatedly, the organisation now seeks to equate average costs and average revenue 
rather than marginal costs and marginal revenue. As a result there can be ‘gold-plating’ and 
over-investment in quality.25 Third, and more subtly, this pricing policy provides incentives to 
over-invest in order to extend (inefficiently) the capital base since this then allows an increase in 
revenues. 
These are all fairly serious issues. Thus, the government, in its role as owner and regulator of a 
PSIH, needs to exert a substantial degree of effort to try and reduce or eliminate these risks. In 
particular, to correct these potential biases in a PSIH’s behaviour it would likely need both to 
put in place some form of incentive scheme, and associated monitoring mechanisms. This has 
been the approach in other areas. For example, Network Rail (which replaced the privately 
owned RailTrack in the UK), though run as a not-for-profit company limited by guarantee has 
                                                        
23 An obvious example in this respect is provided by the case of the Train Operating Companies (TOCs) 
formed in the UK post-privatisation of British Rail. Here the government has been able to agree subsidies 
as well as payments for long-term investment. While PSIHs obviously differ from the TOCs in several 
respects, notably by not being privately owned companies, it would not be very difficult to design 
mechanisms for PSIHs which that could provide a similar degree of certainty.  
24 If the PSIH is still government owned profit-maximisation here is no different since the monitoring role 
usually played by shareholders and the market is now the responsibility of government.  
25 This is distinct from the previous point in that, for any given project, the costs may be at their, optimal, 
minimal level for the quality chosen, but that quality will be at inefficiently high level. To put this in terms 
of a simple example, suppose a purchase of a computer system is being considered. There are two 
manufacturers M and N and both offer a high and medium quality system. The two manufacturer’s systems 
are equally good but N’s one costs more. In addition, M’s high quality system just breaks even (revenues 
equal costs) while the medium quality system results in a profit (revenues exceed costs). Here then, 
inefficiency in the first sense would be to choose the N system over the M system resulting in simple over-
payment. Inefficiency in the second sense would be choosing the high quality system – profits are zero in 
this case but would have been higher with the medium quality system.  
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put in place a fairly complex incentives package for managers and is also monitored by the 
Office of Rail Regulation. 
A similar approach could also be taken if a marginal cost pricing regime were adopted. Just as 
with average-cost pricing, the regulator (be that government or an independent entity) would 
need to think carefully about providing incentives for (efficient) reduction in costs (while 
keeping investment at the optimal level). To put this in more concrete terms, for those products 
priced at marginal cost the regulator would need to be setting a subsidy level. This subsidy 
would likely be tied to (previous and expected) output and expenditure in some manner. One 
option would be to set the subsidy to equal fixed costs in the last period. However, for obvious 
reasons, this is likely to result in poor incentives to lower costs. Similarly setting a straight per 
output subsidy might lead to over-investment. Nevertheless, something combining these two 
different options is likely a reasonable middle way. By choosing a middle way, and by exerting 
reasonable oversight. 
For example, a regulator could estimate fixed costs based on previous periods’ (multiplied 
perhaps by a deflator to allow for efficiency improvements and technological advance). This 
could then be combined with an estimate of the value of usage to set the subsidy per unit of 
utilisation. Incorporating output measures, the PSIH has incentives to increase usage of their 
data while also making it easier to allow for the introduction of new data products – which is an 
important factor to consider when managing marginal cost pricing.26 
This example, though obviously very lacking in detail, should be sufficient to demonstrate that 
the problems are not insurmountable, and are, in many ways, little different from the issues 
confronting government when a cost-recovery approach is used.27 What is clear in both cases is 
that the incentive questions must be addressed. If they are not, there would most likely be 
serious detrimental impacts on efficiency and general performance. However as long as 
reasonable thought and effort are put into dealing with these issues, in particular by designing a 
robust governance/regulatory regime, these negative consequences can be avoided. 
2.6 CONCLUSION 
Much of the concern about the impact of a change in charging policy (particularly to marginal 
cost or zero cost) is based on a misidentification of charging policy with regulatory structure. 
Having a PSIH dependent on year-to-year ‘vote-funding’ for its activities might well have 
substantial negative impacts – but it would do so whatever charging policy was being followed. 
Conversely, any of the charging policies discussed could be used successfully if an independent, 
                                                        
26 There are other ways to address this. For example one could follow a system used by the TOCs who 
present a ‘shopping-list’ to government of possible capital improvement projects which government then 
chooses form. Alternatively one could provide some way for users to feed back requirements to PSIH 
regarding new datasets to collect. This is also a major advantage to having a PSIH retain a ‘Retail’ arm in 
additional to any marginal cost ‘Wholesale’ arm as ‘Retail’ can pass on feedback regarding their 
requirements to ‘Wholesale’ (in fact, the UK Met Office stated that something like this already occurs with 
their ‘Retail’ division passing back feedback to ‘Wholesale’ as to what new kinds of data would be useful in 
the provision of their own products and services).  
27 Though, interestingly, the need for government to provide funds is likely to ensure these kinds of 
calculations are more ‘in the open’. This may be a significant advantage of marginal cost pricing as an 
increase in transparency benefits all concerned, and, furthermore, requires that a regulator have access to 
the relevant cost and output data from a PSIH on a regular basis. As such, it is one way of credibly 
committing government to a more transparent and active regulatory regime.  
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transparent and coherent governance structure were in place. In this regard charging policy can 
largely be seen as orthogonal to the question of PSIH performance – whether evaluated in terms 
of quality, responsiveness or efficiency. Moreover, the importance of having an adequate 
governance structure – whatever charging policy is chosen – cannot be overemphasised. 
In many countries some of that structure is already in place. However, as already discussed, 
there are likely to be several important ways in which it could be extended in pursuit of 
delivering on the key goals of transparency, certainty and efficiency. If an adequate structure is 
in place, and economists and regulators experience over the last few decades provides plentiful 
experience in this regard, then there is every reason to be confident that almost any pricing 
policy can be implemented without significant adverse effects on the efficiency and performance 
of the PSIHs affected. 
3 WHICH FUNDING MODEL? 
3.1 INTRODUCTION  
When deciding which funding model is ‘best’ we need to know what ‘best’ means. The main 
‘outcome’ variables one would consider are: 
 the value (utility) end consumers derive over and above any payments they make 
 surplus to producers (profits) 
 revenue and expenditure 
 sum of these taking account of the relevant distributional weights.  
For economists, and most policymakers, it will be the last of these, total social welfare, which 
would be the most significant since it is an overall measure which incorporates all of the other 
changes into a single value (usually presented in monetary terms for convenience of 
comprehension). To decide which funding model is optimal simply requires us to perform a 
standard ‘social cost-benefit analysis’. Conceptually, all this involves is summing up the benefits 
and costs from each particular option and seeing which one does best. Of course there are 
some theoretical subtleties, particularly in relation to making adjustments based on who gains 
the benefits and who bears the costs. However, the major challenge will be an empirical one: 
obtaining estimates of the main parameters upon which the calculations depend. 
One last point before we embark on the formal analysis: in what follows we shall concentrate 
solely on comparing two of our three charging options: average cost to marginal cost.28 This is 
not a great restriction for two reasons. First, we are concentrating on upstream material. It 
would therefore be difficult to allow a PSIH to pursue a profit-maximisation regime without 
raising a host of serious competition issues.29 Second, if marginal cost is superior to average 
cost charging then it is also (a fortiori) superior to profit maximisation. Hence, the comparison 
of marginal cost to average cost already yields most of the relevant information we need.30 
                                                        
28 Those who want a full analysis of all of the charging options can find one in Pollock et al. (2008).  
29 See the previous section on regulation.  
30 Of course, if average cost is superior to marginal cost we are left with the possibility that profit-
maximisation is even better. However: a) there are good theoretical reasons why this is unlikely (deadweight 
losses grow as the square of the price increase); b) as mentioned, this is problematic from a competition 
perspective. Furthermore, as we shall see, it is likely that in most cases marginal cost is superior to average 
cost and so this issue is moot.  
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3.2 THEORY 
The theoretical underpinnings of the calculations conducted in this report can best be 
understood by the diagram presented in Figure 1. Here, we show the demand curve for a single 
information ‘product’ which a PSIH could supply.31 This (linear) demand function is shown 
together with the marginal and average cost curves. As illustrated the cost curves correspond to 
a good having constant marginal costs approximately equal to zero and a non-zero fixed cost of 
production. We would emphasise that the particular functional forms and parameters have been 
chosen simply for illustrative purposes and do not necessarily indicate those that will be used in 
doing calculations – though, of course, the natural division of costs into fixed and marginal will 
be retained. 
 
Figure 1: Illustrative demand and cost functions. Shown is a linear demand curve 
for a product with fixed costs and constant marginal costs (approximately equal to 
0). Marginal cost (dot-dashed at very bottom of figure) and average cost curves 
(dashed) are shown 
Table 3 explicitly relates each outcome variable to a particular area under the demand curve in 
Figure 1. Producer surplus equals profits: that is revenue minus costs (fixed as well as variable). 
Thus producer surplus is zero under average cost pricing (this is the definition of average cost 
pricing), and is negative under marginal cost pricing. Consumer surplus, using the partial 
                                                        
31 Implicitly this kind of partial equilibrium analysis assumes that the prices of other goods (and other 
information supplied by the PSIH) are being kept fixed while we analyse this particular item.  
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equilibrium approach adopted here, will equal the area under the demand curve which is above 
the price being set. Since the PSIH is government controlled, producer surplus equals 
government revenue/expenditure. Thus under average cost the government receives and 
expends nothing but under marginal cost must supply a subsidy to cover the fixed costs of 
producing and maintaining the information. 
Table 3: Outcomes under different charging regimes with reference to Figure 1. 
Government revenue has been omitted as it is equal to producer surplus 
   Average Cost   Marginal Cost  
 Consumer Surplus   CPP 21    22QOP   
 Producer Surplus   0   11CQOP   
 Deadweight Loss   21QCQ    0  
 
The next step is to combine consumer and producer surplus together with government 
expenditure and revenue to obtain an overall measure of social welfare. Here, it will often be 
simpler to compare the differences between the two options rather than looking at overall 
welfare. The situation, at least conceptually, is extremely simple with a move from an average to 
a marginal cost charging policy involving two changes: 
 The government must supply the funds to pay the fixed cost producing and maintaining 
the information 
 Users gain surplus equal to this fixed cost plus the deadweight loss.  
Now, if funds/surplus in the hands of the government and in the hands of users were 
equivalent it would be immediately obvious that a marginal cost regime was better – the fixed 
cost would net out and one would be left with the gain of the deadweight loss. However, things 
are not so simple: we need to take account of the benefits those government funds would 
otherwise have generated (if they were not being used for the subsidy). The basic approach for 
performing this kind of cost/benefit analysis is well known. It involves taking uncommitted 
government funds as the numeraire and then adjusting the surplus from the project under 
consideration using the appropriate social weights to reflect the different values of public and 
private costs and benefits. This surplus is then compared to a standard benchmark project upon 
which funds could otherwise have been spent (one unit equally distributed). In essence this is 
asking: are the benefits derived from spending government funds in order to have a marginal 
cost charging policy for this PSI greater than those obtained by spending those government 
funds on the benchmark project. If the answer is yes the project is worthwhile; if the answer is 
no the project is not.32 
                                                        
32 An alternative approach involves taking money in consumer’s pockets as the numeraire. In that case one 
needs to determine the marginal cost of public funds (that is, how much does raising one pound of 
government funds cost general society at the margin).  
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3.2.1 The Multiplier 
The approach laid out uses the standard partial equilibrium approach of equating areas under 
the demand curve with social surplus. But one needs to ask here whether, in this case, demand 
accurately reflects surplus. Note that this is not about the standard question as to whether using 
the uncompensated (Marshallian) demand curve is a good approximation to the compensated 
demand curve (see Willig [1976]; Hausman [1981]). Rather it is the question whether, for the 
information goods considered here, the demand curve systematically misrepresents willingness-
to-pay and hence welfare. There are two major reasons why the answer to this question is likely 
to be an affirmative one in the case of public sector information (further discussion of both of 
these possibilities may be found in the appendix):  
 Public sector information is frequently sold, not direct to consumers, but to intermediate firms 
who in turn provide products (informational or otherwise) to consumers. As such, the demand curve 
observed by the PSIH may significantly understate the true value being generated either 
because downstream firms do not capture the full surplus from their activites or because 
the downstream market is itself imperfectly competitive.  
 The standard demand curve is static, frozen at a particular point in time, with no 
allowance for how it might change, and, in particular, how reductions in present prices 
may, by stimulating the development of products and services both downstream and in 
other markets,33 have a major positive impact on future surplus.  
Both of these two factors provide reasons to think that using the basic demand curve may lead 
to underestimates of the gains from lower prices – equivalently, underestimates of the 
deadweight losses of higher prices. This would imply that, when doing cost/benefit style 
calculations of social welfare, one would need to scale up the welfare related to increases in 
usage of PSI by some form of ‘multiplier’. We therefore introduce such a ‘multiplier’ parameter 
into our calculations below. 
3.2.2 The Form of the Demand Curve, Regime Change and Transaction Costs 
The very limited availability of empirical data necessitates some assumption about the shape of 
the demand curve. The approach adopted here will be to assume that, at least in the region of 
interest, the demand curve may be approximated by a linear function and thus that the elasticity 
of demand captures sufficient information for us to calculate changes in consumer and 
producer surplus. For small changes in prices such an approximation is quite reasonable. Of 
course here the price changes under consideration are likely to be quite substantial. In this case 
using a more convex inverse demand function (e.g. qp 1/= ) or a more a concave one (e.g. 
2= qkp  ) might lead to changes in the surplus estimates. Nevertheless, given the data 
constraints an assumption of linearity seems a reasonable first-order approximation. 
We shall also assume that altering charging policy does not change the costs of a PSIH. In 
reality, it is likely that a change from average to marginal cost pricing would result in a reduction 
in the costs incurred by the PSIH in creating and maintaining the information – for example, 
with marginal costs at zero (so the information is provided free) there may be significantly less 
administrative overhead in relation to billing, contract monitoring, enforcement etc. However, 
                                                        
33 For example, cheaper geodata may lead to more rapid improvement in the quality of the software and 
hardware components of Geographical Information Systems (GIS). Similarly, Weiss (2004) argues that 
marginal cost access to weather data in the US was a large factor in the development of the multi-billion 
dollar weather derivatives industry.  
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while such cost changes may not be negligible, we will ignore them here for three reasons. First, 
such cost changes are very difficult to calculate given the data available. Second, such cost 
changes are probably ‘second-order’, that is small relative to the main effects. Third, and 
perhaps most decisively, such an omission is ‘conservative’, in the sense that it biases the results 
towards the average-cost regime (which is currently the default in many countries). While 
inserting ‘bias’ is never first-best, inserting a ‘conservative’ one could be seen here as a 
reasonable ‘second-best’ – and where a marginal cost (or zero) price cost regime is found to be 
preferable, this ‘bias’ would be irrelevant in the sense that it would make the preferability 
‘stronger’. 
Finally, transaction costs will also be ignored, whether these relate to transitioning to a new 
charging regime or to running a given regime. Our reasons for doing so are similar to those just 
discussed for general costs. First, there is no data on which to base estimates of their 
magnitude. Second, in the case of the costs of transition these are likely to be small, at least 
compared to the magnitude of the other sums involved. Third, for general transaction costs a 
move from an average cost to marginal cost regime would likely result in a reduction due to less 
need for monitoring and enforcement. Thus, ignoring them can either be seen as having little 
effect or as instilling a ‘conservative’ bias in favour of the existing regime. Again, inserting such 
‘bias’ is not first-best, but given its ‘conservative’ nature it could be seen as a reasonable 
‘second-best’. 
Table 4: Key variables 
Name  Variable  
   Distributional weight for the project under consideration. Note that the 
‘marginal cost of public funds’ equals 
1
.  
F   Revenue under average cost pricing (equal to fixed costs of the PSIH in producing and maintaining the information).  
DWL    Size of deadweight loss under average cost pricing.  
g   The proportion of revenue derived from government sources under average cost pricing.  
   Demand curve ‘multiplier’. Note that 1 .  
   (Absolute) elasticity of demand at price under an average cost regime. 
qp,   Price and output under average cost pricing (point C in figure 1).  
q   The (absolute) change in quantity (usage) as a result of moving from average cost to marginal cost pricing. 
 
3.2.3 Algebra 
This subsection converts the preceding discussion into an equation which characterises the 
welfare difference between the average and marginal cost regimes in terms of the key underlying 
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variables (listed in Table 4). The numeraire for all of these calculations will be government 
funds (and not funds in the hands of consumers). The choice of numeraire has no effect on the 
signs of any value and therefore on choice of policy, but simply acts to scale outcome values. 
Taking government funds as the numeraire seems the natural approach here given their 
centrality in the calculations – it is government funds that will be used in paying any subsidy. 
As already discussed at the end of Section 3.1 the change from the average cost to marginal cost 
regime has two simple effects:34 
 The government must supply the fixed cost F   
 Users gain surplus of the fixed cost plus ‘deadweight loss’: DWLF   . 
The next step is to ensure that both of these terms are represented in terms of the numeraire 
which is government funds. Obviously government expenditure need not be modified but any 
gains to those outside government need to be scaled by the distributional weight  . Thus the 
first step is to break-down the costs and benefits into those accruing to the government, and 
those accruing outside government, whether to consumers (consumer surplus) or to producers 
(producer surplus). The breakdown is show in Table 5. The important point is that the values in 
the unweighted subsection are not necessarily commensurable since they are not expressed with 
respect to the same numeraire. Those in the second ‘weighted’ subsection have been corrected 
with the necessary distributional weights to ensure they are all expressed in terms of the 
numeraire used (government funds). 
Table 5: Theoretical breakdown of surplus 
Item Expression 
Unweighted (no common numeraire) 
 Cost:   F
 Benefit  
 DWLF 
 o/w Govt  
 gF
 o/w Non-Govt Surplus  
 DWLFg  )(1
Weighted (numeraire = govt funds) 
   Government: G    Fg)(1
   Consumer Surplus: CS    ))((1 DWLFg 
   Total Welfare: W    DWLFg   ))(1(1
 
                                                        
34 We should note here that, in addition to the items already mentioned, we will also ignore issues such as a) 
some of ‘consumer’ surplus is really accruing to firms and therefore may flow back to the government as 
tax (and may have a different distributional weight) b) a time differential in the impact of benefits and costs. 
These are likely to have a relatively small effect and the reader seeking a full treatment can see Pollock et al. 
(2008).  
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Our last step is to relate the PSIH fixed cost: F , and the deadweight loss: DWL . The fixed 
cost equals price times quantity under average cost pricing: pqF = . The deadweight loss is 
more complex and its exact size will depend on the shape of the demand curve. Using the linear 
form for the demand curve the expression for the deadweight loss takes a particularly simple 
form as follows:  
q
qF
q
qpqqpQTriangleCQDWL
2
=
2
=
2
1== 21
   
It will be useful to rewrite this in terms of the elasticity using the fact that ppqq /=/   :35  
p
pFDWL
2
=    
Noting that pp =  (as marginal cost = 0) we have 
2
= FDWL  and thus that:  


 
2
))(1(1=  gFW  
In terms of decision-making all that matters is whether the change in social welfare is positive 
or negative ( 0<>W ). Since the term outside of the brackets is always positive it follows 
that W  is greater than zero, and hence that marginal cost pricing delivers higher social 
welfare than average cost pricing, if and only if:  
)(11
2
g 

 (1) 
In words this could be expressed as:  
    ‘Per–Unit’ Deadweight Loss ≥ Per–Unit ‘Cost’ of the Subsidy 
Thus, this is simply the original costs and benefits compared but ‘per unit’ of the fixed cost 
needed (F ) and normalised by the appropriate distributional weights. 
3.3 EMPIRICS 
This section combines estimates of the key parameters derived from the the existing literature 
and evidence from PSIHs with the formula derived at the end of the last section so as to 
provide guidance as to whether a change from an average cost to a marginal cost pricing regime 
would be welfare improving. 
3.3.1 Distributional Weights and the Social Value of Public Funds 
As previously discussed the numeraire for surplus calculations will be uncommitted government 
funds. It is then necessary to compute  , the distributional weight for the specific project 
under consideration. Roughly the logic here is that uncommitted public funds could either be 
                                                        
35 Note that this would normally be only an approximate equality but for the case of linear demand it is 
exact.  
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used for lowering the price of PSI or for some other government purposes. These uncommitted 
funds, by definition, have a weight of one.36 This is almost certainly not true for the (consumer 
and producer) surplus generated by the project under consideration, and the appropriate 
distributional weight will depend on how the project’s benefits are realised across the 
population which in turn depends on the existing distribution of income, the degree of 
inequality aversion, the marginal utility of consumption and the income elasticity of demand for 
PSI data. 
Here, it will be assumed that the benefits from lowering the price of PSI are received in proportion to income. 
Specifically, the income elasticity of consumption of PSI is assumed to be one. This is a fair 
assumption given that general consumption is (approximately) proportional to income. Using 
this together with estimates of the distribution of income over the population and the elasticity 
of the marginal utility of income we obtain a range for   of  0.718–0.857 with a point estimate 
of 0.802.37 
3.3.2 Elasticity of Demand For PSI 
In this section we survey the direct and indirect evidence on the elasticity of demand public 
sector information and use it to form a sense of likely range of elasticities applicable in the 
majority of cases. The (absolute) price elasticity of demand can be interpreted as the percentage 
increase in demand resulting from a 1% reduction in price (or, conversely the percentage 
decrease in demand resulting from a 1% increase in price).38 A change in pricing policy by a 
PSIH (or other entity) allows one to elicit the elasticity of demand by comparing prices and 
demands before and after the change. However, in some situations the price changes can be 
quite substantial. In such cases the elasticity will depend upon whether one uses the old price 
and output pair (before the change), or the new price and output pair (after the change). We 
discuss this point further in Appendix 6 and show that using one or other of the price-output 
pairs generate a set of lower/upper bounds for the elasticity. 
We begin with Weiss (2004) which itself surveys a variety of existing evidence both anecdotal 
and systematic. He argues that the price elasticity for information is likely to be high in most 
cases and ‘only when use of the information is mandatory or somehow indispensable might the 
demand be less elastic’. 
The Office of Fair Trading (2006) also surveys existing data on the elasticities of demand for 
information in other countries. For example, it suggests an elasticity of 0.3 for New Zealand 
national mapping data based on evidence quoted by Longhorn and Blakemore (2004): ‘Rhind 
reviewed data charging outcomes after New Zealand had imposed a rigorous cost recovery 
program on national mapping, noting a reduction in sales between 1989 and 1994 of 60%, 
although income was 25% greater in real terms’. However this calculation appears to be using 
the lower bound – using the same calculation as in Appendix 6 one finds that 0.3 is the lower 
bound and that the upper bound is around 2.2. 
                                                        
36 That is, there is at least one project in the government portfolio where £1 of expenditure generates 
benefits equivalent to £1 equally distributed across the population.  
37 We have omitted a detailed derivation of this figure as the calculation is a standard one and not specific to 
the subject matter of this paper. Those who want full details, including references for all data sources, are 
directed to the Appendix to Pollock et al. (2008).  
38 Note that formally an elasticity is negative (since the price reduction is negative). However, for 
convenience, and to match with the definition used in the theory subsection above, the elasticity of demand 
has been defined so as to (normally) be positive rather than negative.  
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Davies and Slivinski (2005) suggest that the elasticity for demand of weather forecasts is 0.3 
based on evidence by Lazo and Chestnut (2002). However this paper only measures direct 
household demand for improving day-to-day weather forecasts through stated preference 
surveys. This should therefore be treated as a lower bound since it excludes demand for weather 
data coming from intermediaries and the private sector. 
The study of Bedrijvenplatform (2000) claims ‘lowering the price of public sector geographic 
data by 60% would lead to a 40% annual turnover growth’. Interpreting turnover as revenue 
one finds an upper bound elasticity of 4.17 and a lower bound elasticity of 0.48 using the same 
calculations as in Appendix 6. 
Under the Making Information Freely Available initiative, Statistics New Zealand is in the process 
of making a wide range of products and data available for free.39 For example, Digital 
Boundaries Files on CD and StreetLink files were distributed for free from 6 July 2007.40 Digital 
Boundaries Files previously cost around NZ$3300 for the standard five-yearly census pattern, 
or NZ$25,212 for the annual detailed file. StreetLink Files previously cost NZ$6000 for first 
supply and then NZ$2000 for annual updates. As of 28 August 2007 around 250 copies of 
Digital Boundaries CDs and 75 StreetLink files have been provided.41 This is a two-fold and 
ten-fold increase in Digital Boundaries Files and Street Link Files respectively in the six weeks 
after charges were withdrawn compared with what Statistics New Zealand sold in the past three 
and a half years. 
Using these immediate changes in demand would imply very high elasticities. However the 
initial surge of requests could be a consequence of a backlog of demand for the data at zero-
cost and so the annual uptake is likely to stabilise at a much lower level. Bearing this in mind it 
seems appropriate to use this recent demand to approximate the average annual uptake. Doing 
so and using equation (4) one finds an upper bound elasticity of around 6 and 34 for Digital 
Boundaries and StreetLink Files respectively. Small Area Population Estimates which previously 
cost around NZ$250 were made free to download on 28 August 2007. By 14 September 2007 
there had been 184 accesses by unique visitors compared to around 75 customised jobs per year 
previously. Again using this recent uptake to approximate the new annual output and using 
equation (4) one finds an upper bound elasticity of around 1.5. These estimates are still likely to 
be too high since the high surge in demand may include a large number of users who are 
unlikely to find the data of use, but request it at no cost to see if it may be suitable. 
The Australian Bureau of Statistics made information free on their website towards the end of 
2005. Table 6 shows the total products download statistics from 2003–07.42 Figure 2 graphs 
usage of ABS statistics over this time period.43 It is clear that there is a significant increase in the 
                                                        
39 The policy press release is available at 
www.beehive.govt.nz/Documents/Files/Statistical%20Info%20FAQ.pdf for details.  
40 See press statement available at www.beehive.govt.nz/ViewDocument.aspx?DocumentID=2998.  
41 See statement available at www.beehive.govt.nz/ViewDocument.aspx?DocumentID=30426.  
42 This data is available in Table 13.3 in the ABS Annual Report at 
www.abs.gov.au/AUSSTATS/abs@.nsf/39433889d406eeb9ca2570610019e9a5/FBF88ADA798ABCA1C
A257371001411C3?opendocument.  
43 Available at 
www.epsiplus.net/content/download/7380/88070/file/3_3_ePSIplus_TM2_Pricing2_QUT_11107.pdf. 
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usage of data once it was made freely available. Comparing the average dissemination of 2003–
05 with 2005–07 estimates (crudely) gives an elasticity of 2.33.44 
 
 
Figure 2: Australian Bureau of Statistics ‘Dissemination of Statistics’ 
Table 6: Product downloads from ABS website  
   2003–04   2004–05   2005–06   2006–07  
 Reported   948,956   962,872   1,868,280   4,501,530  
 
The Office of Spatial Data Management in Australia conducted a wider program to make 
available fundamental spatial data across a range of agencies for free or at marginal cost.45 The 
policy was announced in September 2001 and implemented over a six-month period so that by 
February 2002 agencies were providing data for free online, or at marginal cost in CD format. 
Table 7 details the delivery figures for scheduled datasets (i.e. those that fell under the new 
policy).46 Unfortunately no data was available for the period before the pricing policy  was 
                                                        
44 Using the 2007 values rather than an average 2006–07 would give an even higher elasticity of around 3.5. 
Thus the long-run elasticity might well be even higher – though of course one would need to then make 
efforts to detrend for the effect of technical advance and general growth in demand.  
45 This list of fundamental spatial datasets is listed on the Data Schedule available at 
www.osdm.gov.au/schedule/schedule_search.jsp.  
46 Figures from 2001–02 are quoted by OSDM as from the fundamental dataset. This is understood to be 
all data listed on the Data Schedule as ‘This Policy is premised on the view that all fundamental spatial data 
should be freely available at no more than marginal cost of transfer in order to maximise the net economic 
and social benefits arising from its use’ (www.osdm.gov.au/fund_pricing.html). OSDM also state that the 
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announced. However, if one makes the conservative estimate that data delivered in 2000–01 
was no more than in 2001–02 and compares this to uptake in 2005–06 gives an elasticity of 
upper bound elasticity of 10.45. Of course this does not take into account any general increase 
in demand due to other factors. One approach would be to detrend using the ABS figures since 
their data did not become freely available until 2005. Using the ABS data a reasonably generous 
estimate for the growth rate 2001–05 (for non-free data) would be around 44.2%. The effects of 
applying this growth rate is shown in Table 7 as Trend 1. Comparing the 2005–06 value in 
Trend 1 with the reported value suggests an elasticity of 1.65. 
Table 7: Office of Spatial Data Management Scheduled (free) Datasets Delivered. 
The figures in brackets are estimates. Trend 1 uses a growth rate of 44.2%  
 Year   Scheduled Dataset Units Delivered   Trend 1  
 2000–01   (75,310)   –  
 2001–02   75,310   75,310  
 2002–03   83,049   108,597  
 2003–04   52,565   156,597  
 2004–05   219,821   225,813  
 2005–06   862,530   325,622  
 
In order to supplement this direct evidence we also look at estimates coming from the area of 
telecommunications. Many analogies can be drawn between the information and 
telecommunications sectors making them suitable for comparison. Both are related to 
innovation and new technology. Both serve as inputs into other activities and both display 
spillover (multiplier) effects. Telecommunications is also a route through which information can 
be distributed and hence they are intrinsically related. The internet for example offers access to 
a wide range of information. Part of the demand for access to the internet will therefore reflect 
the demand for this information, and so the elasticities in each sector can be compared. 
Hausman et al. (1997) finds a price elasticity of 1.61 and 0.51 for the introduction voice 
messaging and mobile phones respectively in the United States. Goolsbee (2006) finds an 
average price elasticity of demand for broadband of 2.75 at an average price of $40 per month 
for a range of metropolitan areas in the US. Goolsbee and Klenow (2006) takes into account 
the opportunity cost of ones time to deduce the value of using the internet and so estimates a 
price elasticity of 1.6. Kridel et al. (2002) find a price elasticity of broadband of about 1.8 at 
$49.95 a month. Hackl and Westlund (1996) finds a range of price elasticities of demand for 
international telecommunications in Sweden from 0.09 to 1.25. 
To sum up, as we have just seen direct evidence on the price elasticity of information is 
relatively limited. Estimates often are based on large changes in prices which result in a large 
                                                                                                                                                
‘Australian government spatial datasets that are available under the terms of the Policy on Spatial Data 
Access and Pricing (‘the Policy’) are listed on the Schedule’. 
(www.osdm.gov.au/schedule/schedule_search.jsp). This policy states that ‘Fundamental spatial data will be 
provided … at no more than the marginal cost of transfer ’. (www.osdm.gov.au/policy/accessPricing.html)  
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range of elasticities. Furthermore, the elasticity will vary depending upon the product under 
consideration. Thus we offer three basic ranges for the elasticity of demand for PSI which can 
then used as a basic for classification and discussion. The ranges are:47 
 0–0.5 (midpoint: 0.25)  
 0.5–1.5 (midpoint: 1.0)  
 1.5–2.5 (midpoint: 2.0).  
While true that the evidence is currently limited and often displays quite a range it is it is 
noteworthy that the elasticities from the direct and indirect evidence discussed above are 
generally quite high (i.e. greater than 1). Thus, at least with our present state of knowledge, it 
would appear that the medium or high range would be the most appropriate for the majority of 
PSI products. 
3.3.3 The Multiplier 
The theoretical analysis in Section 3 provided some reasonable a priori grounds for believing 
that the ‘multiplier’ could be significant. However, it would obviously be important to have 
empirical evidence for the significance and magnitude of the ‘multiplier’. Unfortunately, there is, 
at present, very little such evidence available. This is perhaps not surprising given the difficulties 
to be faced and the general lack of the detailed time-series firm-level data which would be 
required. However there are some suggestive individual items as well as a body of more 
‘anecdotal’ evidence that can be drawn upon.48 
Weiss (2004) argues that marginal cost access to weather data in the US was a large factor in the 
development of the multi-billion dollar weather derivatives industry (and that its limited 
availability has retarded developments in the EU). An analogous argument for general weather 
services is made in a recent paper by Richard Pettifer, general secretary of PRIMET.49 It argues, 
that particularly by comparison with the US, the EU weather marketplace is seriously 
underdeveloped. It goes on to argue that much of the potential, but unrealised value, lies in the 
‘small unit value sector of the market place which is extremely price sensitive’. Furthermore, 
and of more relevance to this subsection, realising the potential value of those markets would 
involve the development of new products and services based on cheaper access to the data 
collected by national meteorological services.50 
                                                        
47 These ranges should be interpreted as reasonably short-run elasticities. Over the long term elasticities are 
likely to be higher as new uses and applications for data are found.  
48 There is, of course a significant literature on spillovers in R&D, particularly from public to private R&D. 
For example Jaffe (1989) and Mansfield (1995) both provide evidence of large spillover effects in this area.  
49 Towards a Stronger European Market in Applied Meteorology. PRIMET is the association of Private 
Meteorological Services. Obviously, their particular interest in this area should be taken into account when 
considering the arguments made in the document.  
50 Specifically, according to the document: ‘[T]his potential market [the small unit value, high potential 
demand] is not reached by the large government owned players because their high fixed costs and politically 
sponsored operating constraints prevent them from delivering the end user price and flexibility this market 
demands. It is not fully penetrated by the small, private sector companies largely because the exploitation of 
the monopoly supply position of the government owned players in respect of the raw material necessary to 
permit the development of suitable products at appropriate market prices. The data are subject to wholesale 
pricing that is too high and in some cases there is a failure to supply the data in a timely fashion (or at all), 
while re-use license terms can render it impossible fully to exploit the non rival nature of the data.’  
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Turning to geographic data, again hard data is sparse. Returning to Australia, the Spatial 
Information Industry Action Agenda (2001) presents evidence that reducing the price of access 
to geographic information had a significant impact on use and, more importantly, re-use: ‘The 
most important impact has been the dramatic increase in the volume of data sold. In Victoria, 
the number of licences or ‘‘seats’’ has increased from around ten before the price reductions to 
about 600. In Queensland, over 75 licences to distribute and value-add to the data have been 
issued, whereas under the previous arrangements no whole-of-state sales were made at the then 
commercial rate’. Meanwhile, Bedrijvenplatform (2000), looking at the Netherlands suggested 
that a substantial portion of the benefits from cheaper geodata would arise from the 
development of new products and services. In the UK, the Ordnance Survey themselves 
commissioned Oxera in 1999 to estimate the value of the economic infrastructure ‘built on’ OS 
data.51 The resulting report gave an estimate that around £79–136 Billion of Gross Value 
Added came from activities for which the Ordnance Survey’s geographic information was a 
primary input. Of course this figure does not tell one much directly about the multiplier since 
the fact that many businesses use (or even depend) on OS data does not itself indicate how 
large the spillovers are or how much innovation is occurring. Nevertheless the report is 
indicative of the fact that geographic information is widely used, particularly as an input into 
intermediate products and services, which in turn suggest the multiplier could be quite 
significant.52 
Finally, analogies can also be drawn with the spillovers in other sectors. The Power of 
Information review (Mayo and Steinberg, 2007) itself provided several examples. For example, 
in medical studies such as Rodgers and Chen (2005) and Ziebland (2004) on breast cancer and 
Hellinger (2002) on HIV, it was found that access to medical information on the internet 
allowed users to cope better with a resulting reduction, in some cases, in treatment costs. On a 
different tack, Hampton (2007) finds that members of ‘wired’ neighbourhoods are more likely 
to know each other and Lomax (2005) finds that providing clear information with medication 
can improve patient adherence to medical advice by 16–33%. One could argue that similar 
spillover would be present for some of the products considered below. For example, easier 
access to DVLA data could enable more and better HPI checks, leading to a greater return of 
stolen vehicles and a reduction in theft. Similarly, the Land Registry’s data on property 
boundaries where better access could make it easier for planners of construction projects to 
contact those owning neighbouring land.53 
Turning this diverse, and predominantly anecdotal evidence into an exact estimate for the 
‘multiplier’ is clearly impossible. Furthermore, the multiplier will vary across products (just as 
the elasticity will). Thus, as with the elasticity, we proceed by using three basic ranges. Recalling 
                                                        
51 See www.ordnancesurvey.co.uk/oswebsite/aboutus/reports/oxera/index.html.  
52 The argument that there are large potential gains from increased access to and re-use of PSI can be found 
in the PIRA report prepare for the European Commission back in 2000 (PIRA, 2000) – with a similar set of 
points made in OECD, Working Party on the Information Economy (Directorate for Science Technology 
and Industry) (2006). As with most material the contentions are based more upon analogy with the United 
States, and a general consideration of the market, than any ‘hard’ data – not surprising given how difficult 
‘hard’ data would be to obtain.  
53 One could multiply these examples of ‘potential’ applications almost indefinitely. Easier access to current 
and historical weather data might help those researching climate change. Better access to geographic 
information would enable greater citizen understanding and participation in the planning at the local, 
regional and national level. Increased freedom of re-use would greatly multiply the potential for specific 
groups, whether those with disabilities such as the blind or with particular interests such as walkers, to add 
value to basic geographic data whether via annotation or integration with other sources of data.  
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that the multiplier has a lower bound of 1 corresponding to no multiplier effect on welfare, a 
suitable set would be: 
 1  
 1–3 (midpoint: 2.0)  
 3–9 (midpoint: 6.0).  
Given the great uncertainty about the exact value for the multiplier any assignment for a 
particular product will necessarily be substantially speculative. Thus, when performing welfare 
calculations, it will be important for robustness to check all results using a multiplier of one (i.e. 
no effect). This way, while the multiplier is incorporated into the analysis one can also be sure 
that it is not ‘driving the results’. 
3.4 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
As should be clear from the preceding discussion, while our estimate for the distributional 
weight   is fairly good, our estimates of the other major parameters are highly uncertain. 
However, recall from equation (1), that a MC pricing regime is equal to or superior to AC if and 
only if: 
)(11
2
g 

 
Substituting 0.802=  and multiplying both sides by 2 gives:  
2
1 g  
Assuming the proportion of government usage is 0  (the most pessimistic scenario for the 
marginal cost regime) then gives that MC pricing is superior to AC pricing if:  
2
1  
3.4.1 Charging for Use 
Thus, deciding on the charging regime for a given piece of PSI reduces to deciding whether the 
product of the multiplier and the elasticity is greater than a half. Since the multiplier,  , is 
always greater than or equal to 1, an elasticity above a half is sufficient to imply that marginal 
cost pricing is preferable to average cost pricing.54 The full sets of outcomes as a function of the 
three categories (low, medium, high) for the multiplier and the elasticity are shown in Table 8. 
The evidence presented previously suggest that for most examples of (digital, upstream) public 
sector information the medium or high range for the elasticity would be the most appropriate. 
Thus, for these kinds of public sector information marginal cost pricing for users is the preferable 
option. 
 
                                                        
54 Though, as discussed previously, we are likely to be dealing with large changes in price and demand. In 
this case we might want to be cautious, particularly given the underlying linearity assumption, and require a 
somewhat higher elasticity and/or multiplier before being certain that marginal cost were preferable.  
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Table 8: Preferred user charging regimes for different parameter values. AC (MC) indicates 
that average cost (marginal cost) pricing is preferable throughout the range. AC/MC 
indicates that average cost and marginal cost pricing is preferable, but in different parts of 
the range (the figure in brackets indicates what is preferable at the mid-points of both 
ranges.) 
 
       
     1   1–3   3–9  
 3*   
  
  
 0.0–0.5   AC   AC/MC (AC)   AC/MC (MC)  
 0.5–1.5   MC   MC   MC  
 1.5–2.5   MC   MC   MC  
 
3.4.2 Charging for Updates 
So far in our discussion of funding policies we have large ignored the possibility of ‘updater’ or 
‘write’ funding, that is charging those who make updates to the information set. Though in 
some cases there are no ‘updaters’ to charge in other cases, perhaps the majority, there clearly 
are – in fact some PSIH’s primary function is ‘registration’.55 
Importantly all of our theoretical analysis developed for normal information ‘users’ can also be 
applied to the case of ‘updates’. That is, just as for ‘users’, we can compare charging ‘updaters’ a 
price equal to the marginal cost of their activities or a price equal to average cost (that is 
sufficient to cover fixed costs as well). Since the analysis is essentially identical all we need to do 
is replace the elasticity of demand with the elasticity of registration/updates and the multiplier 
for use with a ‘multiplier’ for updates.56 
This is instructive because the parameters for ‘updates’ are likely to differ substantially from 
those for ‘use’. In particular, for ‘updates’ there are no systematic distortions of the willingness-
to-pay. As such multiplier effect are likely to negligible ( 1= ). Furthermore, the elasticity of 
‘demand’ for updates is likely to be (very) low: most such updates occur as a very small, but 
legally required part, of some larger activity – such as buying a house, creating and running a 
                                                        
55 For example, PSIHs dealing with property, vehicle and company ownership. Non-registration examples 
are perhaps more interesting here because less obvious. One important example relates to geospatial 
datasets. Today, many of the changes which occur to such datasets are likely to be anthropogenic, arising 
from activities such as construction, road-building etc. As such, it would be possible to levy charges upon 
those carrying out the activities leading to changes in a geospatial dataset (and such changes are often 
already being logged via some form of planning process).  
56 In fact we need to a little bit more: for ‘updates’ we cannot take marginal cost as zero and hence the 
formula would become: p
p
2

 where p  is the reduction in price when going from average cost pricing 
( p ) to marginal cost pricing. We might also want to perform a more complete two-sided analysis. This 
would involve taking account of the impact of each side on the other – i.e. the impact of more ‘updates’ on 
the demand of ‘users’ and of an increase in ‘users’ on the demand for ‘updates’. However, for most public 
sector information it is reasonable to assume these effects are fairly negligible (‘updaters’ especially care 
little about ‘users’ – though an important exception is provided by the case of harbours which often need to 
be properly charted to be usable by marine vessels).  
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users to create new products and services based on the information. Second, the case for hard 
budget constraints to ensure efficient provision and induce innovative product development is 
weak for public enterprises not subject to regulation and providing monopoly services without 
fear of competition. It would be far better to address issues of incentives, regulation and 
commitment explicitly rather than indirectly through budget constraints. Finally, for several 
services, the government is already providing effectively a large contribution to fixed costs, 
without allowing the public to enjoy the benefits of efficient pricing. 
By contrast, it may well be good policy to charge ‘updaters’ of public sector information prices 
above marginal costs, using the funds thereby obtained to cover (some portion) of the fixed 
costs of maintenance and collection. This is in accordance with good Ramsey pricing principles 
that if distortionary mark-ups are necessary to cover or contribute to fixed costs, they should be 
higher for inelastically demanded goods and lower for elastically demanded ones (in simple 
cases, the mark-up divided by the price should be inversely proportional to the elasticity of 
demand). 
To conclude: most upstream, digital public sector information is best funded out of a combination of 
‘updater’ fees and direct government contributions with users permitted free and open access. Appropriately 
managed and regulated this model offers major societal benefits from increased provision and access to 
information-based services while imposing a very limited funding burden upon government. 
APPENDIX 
5 THE DEMAND CURVE AND SOCIAL WELFARE 
5.1 INTERMEDIATE FIRMS 
Consider, as an example, the case where a PSIH sells to a downstream firm which is a 
monopolist in its own market. In that case, with royalty-based pricing, one would have a classic 
case of ‘Cournot complements’ and attendant double marginalisation, and the demand curve 
seen by the PSIH would under-represent actual demand and welfare changes.57 
A similar, but different, effect arises if downstream firms have fixed costs as a result of the 
Dupuit triangle.58 Imagine there are a large number of downstream firms each demanding one 
unit of the information but with different fixed costs. The PSIH’s demand curve then arises 
from aggregating across all these downstream firms. Pick a point on the PSIHs demand curve, 
qp,  say, and consider an increase of p  in the price charged resulting in some reduction q  
in purchases.59 
This reduction in demand corresponds to some downstream firms ceasing to purchase (and 
hence ceasing production). Consider one of these firms and let initial revenue be R  and C  
their total costs (excluding the payment for data). Then one must have pCR   (since 
                                                        
57 Note that this effect still occurs if the downstream market is an oligopoly rather than a monopoly though 
the degree of double-marginalisation will decrease as the level of competition increases.  
58 This effect occurs whether the tariff used by a PSIH is a royalty or a fixed fee – unlike the case of 
‘Cournot complements’.  
59 Since only one unit of the product is demanded here this is necessarily a fixed fee. However this 
argument can easily be extended to the more general case where demand is variable and the PSIH sets a 
nonlinear tariff.  
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ppCR  <  and pCR  ). What about the surplus generated by this firm? Its 
producer surplus is zero ( 0=pCR  ) but consumer surplus, denoted CS, is almost 
certainly not zero. Thus, from the point of view of society current total surplus produced by 
this firm is CSp . However using the demand curve of the PSIH all that would be recorded 
is the p  coming from the payment for data.60 
5.2 DYNAMICS AND INNOVATION 
Lower prices for information today, by increasing access and usage, are likely to stimulate the 
rate of innovation both downstream and in related (especially complementary) markets. For 
example, cheaper geodata may lead to more rapid improvement in the quality of the software 
and hardware components of Geographical Information Systems (GIS). Or, as Weiss (2004) 
argued, marginal cost access to weather data in the US was a large factor in the development of 
the multi-billion dollar weather derivatives industry. 
It is quite possible for such effects on welfare to be large, much larger in fact than those arising 
from purely static considerations related to the underlying product’s demand curve.61 
Furthermore this may be true even if the current costs of access are relatively low – at least 
relative to the potential benefits. This is somewhat surprising since normally one would imagine 
that the cost of a particular piece of information should place a (rough) upper limit on the value 
of the innovations which it enables.62 
However, there are a variety reasons why this basic logic fails. The simplest example is to 
consider a chain of cumulative innovations in which an innovator at each stage can only extract 
some fraction r  of the total surplus generated by the subsequent innovator. In this case for a 
chain of length N the initial innovator only receives Nr  of the actual surplus generated (and so 
conversely an innovator with a willingness to pay of only X for a piece of data may be 
generating a surplus of NrX/ ). 
Another possibility is that the innovation effort is distributed across many different firms or 
individuals (‘componentised’ innovation – as an explicit example one could think of an open-
source project working to produce GIS software). In this case if each agent needs access to the 
underlying data supplied by the PSIH in order to contribute to the project the total costs may 
become so high as to be prohibitive.63 Other more complex examples can be found in the 
cumulative innovation literature – see e.g. Bessen and Hunt (2007), Pollock (2008). 
                                                        
60 This, of course is in the extreme case where the firms who no longer purchase simply cease operation. 
However the basic point still holds in the more realistic case where a rise in the price of the PSIH’s product 
causes them to substitute it with another (necessarily inferior) input.  
61 Of course, in doing such a calculation, one would need to be cautious about how one allocated these 
‘spillover’ benefits. Just because the data provided by a PSIH is used in (or is even central to) the activities 
of a particular firm does not mean one can allocate the entire surplus generated to the availability of that 
data.  
62 To give a concrete illustration, suppose a particular set of geodata costs £1000 and there is a potential 
innovator who has an idea for a new product based on that geodata worth £ X. If X>1000 then the 
innovator should be willing to pay for access to the geodata. This suggests that only innovations worth less 
than £1000 are lost when the price is at this level.  
63 Suppose the innovation is worth V and the cost of data is X and there are N participants. If these N 
participants were all in a single firm which could obtain a single development license the cost is X, 
willingness to pay is V and the project is undertaken if V>X. However if the participants are distributed 
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For a linear demand curve the high price, low output pair generates a significantly higher 
elasticity. Note also that the demand curve may not be linear. Demand may be more inelastic at 
higher prices, where there are a few large businesses who simply have to have the data and so 
are willing to pay a very high price. However the demand may also be particularly elastic lower 
down the demand curve, where a substantial amount of experimentation with the data may take 
place. Both these effects would reduce the effect on elasticity estimates with different price, 
output pairs. Nonetheless, wherever there are substantial price changes, there will also be a 
significant range in elasticity estimates using the same underlying data. In such cases it may be 
more appropriate to use the mid-point as opposed to either the upper or lower bounds. 
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